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BALANCING NECESSITY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE FIGHT 
AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: “TARGETED KILLINGS” 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Karinne Coombes*
This article explores the restraints international human rights 
law and international humanitarian law place on a State’s use of 
lethal force against suspected terrorists. Although the law restricts 
the ability to target suspected terrorists, it is argued that these 
limits should be respected in order to protect innocent civilians 
from undue harm. Under IHRL, it is argued that the right to 
life as a peremptory norm restricts extra-territorial targeted at-
tacks of suspected terrorists. Accordingly, such action should only 
be considered lawful when it is necessary to protect the State’s 
population from a known threat and lesser force would not suf-
fice. Under IHL, it is argued that there is no third category of 
“unprivileged” or “unlawful” combatants who are subject to law-
ful targeting for the duration of the hostilities; rather, non-State 
actors who participate in an armed conflict may be lawfully tar-
geted for the duration of their participation, including an on-
going chain of hostile acts.
Cet article explore les contraintes qu’imposent les lois interna-
tionales sur les droits de la personne ainsi que le droit internatio-
nal humanitaire à l’utilisation de force létale par un État contre 
des personnes soupçonnées de terrorisme. Quoique la loi limite 
l’habileté de cibler des personnes soupçonnées de terrorisme, on 
soutient que ces limites devraient être respectées afin de protéger 
les civils innocents contre des préjudices injustifiés. En rapport 
avec les LIDP, on soutient que le droit à la vie comme norme pé-
remptoire limite les attaques extra-territoriales ciblées contre des 
personnes soupçonnées de terrorisme. Conséquemment, on ne de-
vrait considérer de telles actions comme légitimes que si elles sont 
nécessaires pour protéger la population de l’État contre une me-
nace connue et qu’une force moindre ne suffirait pas. En rapport 
avec le DIH, on soutient qu’il n’existe pas de troisième catégorie 
de combattants «non privilégiés» ou «illégitimes» que l’on peut 
cibler légitimement pendant la durée des hostilités; plutôt, les 
acteurs non étatiques qui participent à un conflit armé peuvent 
être ciblés légitimement pendant la durée de leur participation, y 
compris une série d’actes hostiles en cours.
* B.A., B.Sc., M.A., LL.B. This article is largely drawn from a research essay completed as a 
requirement of the joint M.A. (International Affairs)/LL.B. program between the Norman 
Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University and the Faculty of Law at the 
University of Ottawa. The author would like to thank Professor Chris Penny from NPSIA and 
Professor John Currie from the Faculty of Law for their insightful comments and suggestions.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE USE OF LETHAL FORCE IN THE FIGHT 
AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
On 26 October 2008, the United States military conducted a “successful strike” 
eight kilometers into Syrian territory to kill an alleged al Qaeda member who 
was suspected of smuggling money, weapons, and foreign fighters from Syria 
into Iraq.1 Syrian officials protested the action, claiming that the strike killed 
eight and wounded one Syrian civilian. The Syrian foreign minister accused the 
U.S. of violating international law: “Killing civilians in international law means 
terrorist aggression…. We consider this criminal and terrorist aggression,”2 while 
the U.S. Syrian Embassy spokesman asserted that the U.S. should have “share[d] 
their information instead of applying the law of the jungle.”3
 On 22 July 2002, Israel destroyed the home of a wanted terrorist, Salah 
Shehade, in the city of Gaza. The blast from the one thousand kilogram bomb 
used in the attack injured dozens, and killed the target, his wife and family, and 
twelve neighbours. 4 Part of Israel’s policy of “targeted frustration” of terrorism, 
this attack is one of many that Israel has undertaken during the second intifada 
against suspected members of terrorist organizations that are alleged to be in-
volved in planning, launching, or executing terrorist attacks against Israelis.
 Since the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, there 
has arguably been an increased recognition of the threat posed by transnational 
terrorism,5 which has spurred action at national and international levels. Inter-
national law imposes restrictions on the use of lethal force by States; however, 
incidents like the ones described above illustrate recent challenges that the threat 
of transnational terrorism and the fight against it can pose to the limitations 
placed on a State’s use of lethal force against suspected terrorists.6 Central to the 
law restricting a State’s use of lethal force is concern for protecting the rights and 
lives of innocent civilians7 who may be caught in the crossfire of the fight against 
terrorism. The International Commission of Jurists has expressed concern re-
garding counter-terrorist operations,8 while United Nations Security Council 
1 CNN, “Al Qaeda was U.S. target in Syrian attack, official says” CNN (27 October 2008), 
online: CNN Online <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/10/27/syria.iraq/>.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 See Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, HCJ 769/02 (Israel 11 
December 2006) at para. 8 [Targeted Killings].
5 The qualifier “transnational” is used in this article to distinguish non-State from “international” 
or State-sponsored terrorism. Non-State actors committing terrorist attacks in the territory of 
other States will be considered transnational terrorism for the purposes of this article. Such 
groups can be located in one State or many.
6 Consider e.g., the U.S. strikes against suspected terrorists in Yemen in 2001, and its current 
targeting of suspected terrorists in Pakistan.
7 The term “innocent civilian” will be used in contrast to individuals who engage in terrorist 
attacks or armed conflicts, as they arguably retain the status of “civilian,” see section V.B.
8 See International Commission of Jurists, Berlin Declaration, 28 August 2004, online: 
International Commission of Jurists <http://icj.org/IMG/pdf/Berlin_Declaration.pdf> (“The 
world faces a grave challenge to the rule of law and human rights. Previously well-established 
and accepted legal principles are being called into question in all regions of the world through 
ill-conceived responses to terrorism. Many of the achievements in the legal protection of human 
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[UNSC] resolutions may also illustrate the growing recognition that counter-
terrorist activities can lead to violations of international law.9
 This article will explore the restraints on the use of lethal force against sus-
pected terrorists under international human rights law [IHRL] and international 
humanitarian law [IHL].10 Although the law restricts a State’s ability to target 
suspected terrorists, it is argued that these limits should be respected and en-
forced in order to protect innocent civilians from undue harm when a State uses 
force against suspected terrorists. The discussion is divided into four parts. Part 
two will explore the meaning of “terrorism” and the State’s obligations when it 
acts against suspected terrorists. Part three will examine when and how IHRL 
and IHL apply to the use of force by States against suspected terrorists. Part 
four discusses the protections IHRL and IHL provide to civilians. Part five will 
consider the legality of so-called “targeted strikes” against suspected terrorists 
under IHRL and IHL. It is argued that, under IHRL and outside of the context 
of armed conflicts, the right to life guaranteed as a peremptory norm of inter-
national law restricts targeted attacks of suspected terrorists, both inside and out-
side of a State’s borders. Under IHL, it is argued that there is no third category 
of “unprivileged” or “unlawful” combatants that are subject to lawful targeting 
for the duration of the hostilities; rather, non-State actors who participate in an 
armed conflict may be lawfully targeted for the duration of their participation 
in the hostilities, including an on-going chain of hostilities. This approach may 
achieve an appropriate balance, allowing States to act against credible threats 
when it is necessary to protect the State’s population from harm, while pro-
tecting the rights and lives of innocent civilians who become caught in the cross-
fire in the fight against transnational terrorism.
II. TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Threat of Transnational Terrorism
 With rapid technological advances and a “shrinking world” fuelled by global-
ization, the ability of non-State actors to attack populations worldwide has argu-
rights are under attack.”) and International Commission of Jurists, Assessing Damage, Urging 
Action: Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights 
(International Commission of Jurists: Geneva, 2009) [International Commission of Jurists, 
Report] (“The Panel is worried... that some of the counter-terrorist responses do not accord 
with international law and themselves also pose a threat to individuals, communities, and to 
a number of deeply-held values. Some governments seem to have decided that the threat of 
terrorism justifies exceptional responses that are at risk of seriously undermining the rule of 
law. The legal framework explicitly negotiated to ensure international, national, and personal 
security is under attack” at 24).
9 Compare, e.g., Resolution 1618 of 2005, which reaffirms “the need to combat by all means, 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and 
security caused by terrorist acts” and Resolution 1822 of 2008, which reaffirms: “the need to 
combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international 
law, including applicable international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law, 
threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts” (Resolution 1618 (2005), SC 
Res. 1618, UN SCOR, UN Doc. S/RES/1618, preamble [emphasis added], Resolution 1822 
(2008), SC Res. 1822, UN SCOR, UN Doc. S/RES/1822, preamble [emphasis added]).
10 For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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ably increased in recent years. Some commentators believe that the attacks in the 
U.S. on 11 September 2001 illustrated the emergence of a new phenomenon 
“of transnational networks capable of inflicting deadly violence on targets in 
geographically distant states.”11 The UNSC has recognized this phenomenon as 
a threat to international peace and security,12 while Georges Abi-Saab, a former 
judge of the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia [ICTY] has stated that the events of 11 September 2001 trig-
gered a “shock of recognition” regarding the risk of terrorism that previously had 
been contemplated, but not truly understood.13 As the international community 
attempts to address the threat posed by transnational terrorism, the first question 
that arises is: what is “terrorism?”
 Despite many attempts, the international community has been largely un-
successful at defining terrorism.14 In 2004, the UN Secretary-General’s High 
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change recommended that it be defined 
as:
any action… intended to cause death or serious bodily harm 
to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such at-
tack, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, 
or to compel a Government or an international organization 
to do or to abstain from doing any act.15
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan endorsed this definition in 
11 International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges 
of Contemporary Armed Conflict (Geneva: ICRC, 2003) at 17 [ICRC 2003 Report]. 
12 See e.g. Resolution 1373 (2001), SC Res. 1373, UN SCOR, UN Doc. S/RES/1373.
13 Georges Abi-Saab, “The Proper Role of International Law in Combating Terrorism” (2002) 
1 Chinese Journal of International Law. 305 at 306; Christopher Greenwood, Essays on War 
in International Law (London: Cameron May, 2006) (“While international terrorism did not 
begin on that day, the scale of the attacks, the loss of life which they caused, and the means 
with which they were carried out set them apart from all prior terrorist atrocities no matter how 
awful”) at 409.
14 In 1934, member States of the League of Nations discussed drafting a convention outlawing 
terrorism. This led to the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism in 1937, which defined terrorism as: “All criminal acts directed at a State and intended 
or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or groups of persons or 
the general public,” but it never entered into force due an inability to approve this definition; see 
United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee, The Role of the Counter-Terrorism Committee 
and its Executive Directorate in the International Counter-Terrorism Effort, online: UN <http://
www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/fact_sheet_1.pdf> [Counter-Terrorism Fact Sheet]. In 1994, a 
UN General Assembly [UNGA] Resolution defined terrorism as: “criminal acts intended or 
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular 
persons for political purposes,” and provided that such acts were “in any circumstances 
unjustifiable whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, 
religious or other nature:” see Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, GA Res. 49/60, UN 
GAOR 49th Sess., UN Doc. A/RES/49/60 (1994).
15 United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: 
Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 at para. 164.
67422-1 Windsor Yearbook.indb   288 8/5/10   10:48:09 AM
Vol. 27(2) Targeted Killings and International Law 289
2005.16 In the same year, the UN member States agreed on the need for a “clear 
and unqualified condemnation of terrorism” addressing the issue “in all its 
forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever 
purposes,” and to work toward a common definition of and a comprehensive 
convention against terrorism.17 Despite this expressed commitment, these ef-
forts have stalled. Although there is no consensus by States on the definition of 
terrorism, Pierre-Marie Dupuy notes common elements: “Terror exercised on a 
civilian population as a political weapon is evidently at the core of any definition 
of terrorism, the international element being provided by the physical origin of 
the act and/or nationality of the wrongdoers.”18 Since at least 109 possible def-
initions of terrorism have been proposed,19 this article will not endorse one, but 
will consider the core elements to be: (i) the use of armed violence (ii) directed 
against a civilian population (iii) as a political weapon.
B. International Legal Obligations and State Actions
 The sovereign equality of States is a fundamental principle of international 
law.20 Through sovereignty, States enjoy freedom from interference in their in-
ternal affairs as a matter of custom and treaty.21 Sovereignty is not without limits, 
however, as international law places legal constraints on State activity. Under-
scoring these constraints, a second principle of international law is that a State 
incurs responsibility when it or its agents, including its military forces, violate 
the State’s international legal obligations.22 As such, a State will be bound by its 
international legal obligations when responding to the threat of transnational 
terrorism. This article will argue that transnational terrorism poses particular 
challenges for States because, while States will endeavour to protect their popu-
lations from the threat of transnational terrorism, international law limits the 
lawful scope of their response to this threat.
 A fundamental feature of transnational terrorism is that a non-State actor 
commits terrorist attacks outside of the State(s) in which it is based, without the 
sponsorship of the territorial State(s). To combat this threat, some States have 
proved willing to use armed force against suspected terrorists despite the fact that 
they are located in another State.23 Practices such as targeted killings of suspected 
terrorists located outside of the State’s territory raise controversial legal, political, 
and moral issues. When a State uses such force, its actions can risk violating a 
number of areas of international law.
16 Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, U.N. 
Doc. A/59/2005 at para. 91.
17 Counter-Terrorism Fact Sheet, supra note 14.
18 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “State Sponsors of Terrorism: Issues of Responsibility,” in Andrea Bianchi 
ed., Enforcing International Law Norms Against Terrorism (Portland: Hart, 2004) at 5.
19 Ibid.
20 Charter of the United Nations, art. 2(1) [UN Charter].
21 Regarding customary status, see Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14 at para. 205 
[Nicaragua]; as a matter of treaty, ibid., art. 2(1).
22 State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Annex, Agenda 
Item 162, UN Doc. A/RES/56/83 (2001), art. 1 [Articles on State Responsibility].
23 Consider, e.g., the instances noted in the introduction and note 6.
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III. IHRL AND IHL AND THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST 
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
 As noted above, IHL (also known as jus in bello or the law of armed conflict) 
applies during armed conflicts. It regulates the conduct of hostilities and limits 
the lawful actions of the parties to an armed conflict. The law regulating the 
initial recourse to the use of force by a State, jus ad bellum, is a separate branch 
of the law. Although the legality of the use of force by States against suspected 
terrorists outside of armed conflicts would be regulated, in part, by jus ad bellum, 
this area of the law will not be a focus of this article. Rather, this article will exam-
ine the law protecting the rights of individuals when a State uses force against 
suspected terrorists outside of its territory, particularly IHRL and IHL. Despite 
this focus on how the law constrains State action against suspected terrorists, it 
is recognized that for international law to remain relevant—and respected—it 
must allow States and the international community to effectively respond to the 
threat of transnational terrorism. It is argued that a balance that allows States to 
protect their populations from the threat of transnational terrorism while ensur-
ing adequate protection of the rights and lives of innocent civilians is necessary.
A. The Application of International Human Rights Law
 International human rights law provides rights for individuals and, at times, 
groups. Founded upon the principle that “all men are born equal, and with equal 
natural right,” contemporary protection of human rights is based upon human 
dignity and the “inherent worth of human beings.”24 The underlying concept 
of human rights is their universality, which is reflected in the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights.”25 The rights protected by IHRL have been frequently established 
through multilateral treaties.26 In turn, these treaties have helped shape custom-
ary international law, as widespread State acceptance of some human rights has 
resulted in their crystallization as customary law.27 Unlike most areas of inter-
national law that regulate relations between States, IHRL is primarily concerned 
with the relationship between individuals and the State, and was traditionally 
focused on protecting individual rights from infringement by the State in which 
a person is located.28 As such, questions may arise regarding State obligations 
when State actions affect individuals located in another State. In the context of 
24 Mark Freeman & Gib van Ert, International Human Rights Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2004) at 
25.
25 Ibid. at 26.
26 See e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 23 March 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 [ICCPR]; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 
[African Charter]; American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 
143 [American Convention]; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [ECHR].
27 Freeman, supra note 24 at 54.
28 See e.g., ibid at 28.
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the fight against transnational terrorism, it must be determined if IHRL applies 
to a State’s extra-territorial use of force.29
 Most human rights treaties provide that they apply where the States parties 
have jurisdiction, and have been interpreted as meaning “wherever State organs 
have effective control.”30 As such, it may be argued that a State is only bound 
by its obligations under a human rights treaty to which it is a party if it has ef-
fective control of the territory in which it uses force. Ralph Wilde has examined 
the extraterritorial application of human rights law and concludes that the law 
in this context is “highly contested,” “underdeveloped,” and will be subject to 
future “norm development.”31 Despite this potential uncertainty, jurisprudence 
supports the extra-territorial application of a limited number of human rights 
obligations, albeit in limited circumstances.32 The European Commission on 
Human Rights, for example, considered the obligations of State parties to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
[ECHR] in the context of the partial occupation of Cyprus by Turkey and con-
cluded that States parties were “bound to secure the said rights and freedoms to 
all persons under their actual authority and responsibility, whether that author-
ity is exercised within their territory or abroad.”33 The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights went further when it held that a State could be responsible for 
breaching its human rights obligations when it acts in the territory of a State 
that is not party to the treaty in question.34 As Rene Provost notes, in many 
cases, “‘jurisdiction’ has been taken to refer to the state’s power rather than the 
geographical or territorial limitation of this power.”35 In 2004, the UN Human 
Rights Committee [UNHRC] noted that the ECHR requires:
States Parties… to respect and ensure the rights laid down in 
the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control 
29 For a discussion of this issue, see David Kretzmer, “Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: 
Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?” (2005) 16 E.J.I.L. 171.
30 See e.g. ICCPR, supra note 26 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect 
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant,” art. 2(1)); ECHR, supra note 26 (“The High Contracting 
Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in 
Section I of this Convention”, art. 1); Rene Provost, International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 305.
31 Ralph Wilde, “Triggering State Obligations Extraterritorially: The Spatial Test in Certain Human 
Rights Treaties” in Roberta Arnold & Noëlle Quénivet, eds., International Humanitarian Law 
and Human Rights Law: Towards a New Merger in International Law (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2008) 133 at 153.
32 Provost, supra note 30 (“Narrow constructions of the applicability of human rights have been 
rejected to ensure that… they ‘apply always and everywhere’. Thus, the provisions of many 
human rights treaties which restrict their application to ‘individuals under the jurisdiction of 
the state concerned’ have been interpreted to ensure the broadest application of these treaties” 
at 19).
33 Appl. 6780/74 and 6950/75 Cyprus v. Turkey, (1975) 2 Decision and Reports 125 at 136, cited 
ibid.
34 Provost, supra note 30 at 20, referring to Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Suriname, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L./V/II.66, doc. 21 rev. 1 (1985).
35 Ibid., Provost at 19.
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of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of 
the State Party…. This principle also applies to those within 
the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party 
acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in 
which such power or effective control was obtained…36
Such interpretations support the argument that, as a projection of a State’s 
power, “all military operations abroad remain governed by the relevant human 
rights treaties.”37 This is also consistent with the UNHCR’s finding that, “it 
would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the 
[ICCPR] as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on 
the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own 
territory.”38 In the Construction of a Wall Advisory Opinion, the International 
Court of Justice [ICJ] endorsed the Committee’s finding that the Covenant was 
applicable where a State exercises its jurisdiction on foreign territory.39
 A question that persists is what level of control or jurisdiction must a State 
exercise to be bound by its IHRL obligations? Where the State using force is an 
occupying power, as in the second example provided in the introduction to this 
article, that State would clearly be bound by its IHRL obligations. The situation 
is less clear, however, with respect to a targeted strike such as the first example, 
where the State’s fleeting presence in the territory where its target is based is its 
use of extra-territorial force. The European Court of Human Rights decision in 
Bankovic v. Belgium et al. suggests that it may be difficult to establish a breach 
of IHRL in such instances.40 In that case, residents of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) whose relatives who were killed by a NATO air strike on a 
Belgrade television station during the conflict in Kosovo sought to hold NATO 
States parties that were signatories to the ECHR liable for violating, among other 
rights, the right to life guaranteed by Article 2 of the Convention. The appli-
cants argued that the case was admissible on the basis that “the impugned acts 
of the respondent States, which were either in the FRY or on their own territor-
ies but producing effects in the FRY, brought them and their deceased relatives 
within the jurisdiction of those States.”41 When assessing the admissibility of the 
case, the Court adopted a restrictive view of jurisdiction:
36 General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties 
to the Covenant, UN HRCOR, 80th Sess., 2187th Mtg., UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 
(2004) at para. 10.
37 Provost, supra note 30 at 20-21.
38 Lopez v. Uruguay, Communication No. 52/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 88 (1984) at 
para. 12.3.
39 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, [2004] I.C.J. Rep. 136 at paras. 108-111 (The drafters of article 2 “did not intend 
to allow States to escape from their obligations when they exercise jurisdiction outside of their 
national territory. They only intended to prevent residents abroad from asserting, vis-à-vis their 
State of origin, rights that do not fall within the competence of that State, but of the State of 
residence” at para. 110) [Construction of a Wall]. 
40 Bankovic et al. v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States (Appl. No. 52207/99; adm. dec.), 
ECHR 12 December 2001.
41 Ibid. at para. 30.
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As to the “ordinary meaning” of the relevant term in Article 1 
of the Convention, the Court is satisfied that, from the stand-
point of public international law, the jurisdictional compe-
tence of a State is primarily territorial. While international 
law does not exclude a State’s exercise of jurisdiction extra-
territorially, the suggested bases of such jurisdiction... are, as 
a general rule, defined and limited by the sovereign territorial 
rights of the other relevant States.42
The Court concluded that the case was inadmissible because there was no juris-
dictional link between the victims of NATO’s bombing and the extra-territorial 
use of force by the respondent States. Highlighting the potential difficulty in 
holding States accountable for alleged violations of IHRL during extra-territorial 
uses of force, the Court noted that:
The Convention was not designed to be applied through-
out the world, even in respect of the conduct of Con-
tracting States. Accordingly, the desirability of avoiding a 
gap or vacuum in human rights’ protection has so far been 
relied on by the Court in favour of establishing jurisdiction 
only when the territory in question was one that, but for the 
specific circumstances, would normally be covered by the 
Convention.43
Despite the Court’s decision in Bankovic, it is argued that the underlying pur-
pose of IHRL strengthens the argument that a State is bound by at least some 
of its IHRL obligations when it acts extra-territorially. To conclude otherwise 
would be “incompatible with the very notion of the universality of human 
rights, which lies at the foundation of international human rights”44 due to the 
un-universal effect of rendering lawful State action that would be unlawful but 
for the location of the affected person. Extra-territorial application is particularly 
justified when the right at issue is a peremptory norm:
While a state party’s treaty obligations are a function of the 
scope and application defined in the particular treaty, some of 
the substantive norms in human rights treaties that have been 
ratified by the vast majority of states in the world have now 
become peremptory norms of customary international law.45
The character of some human rights as peremptory norms lends strength to the 
extra-territorial application of these IHRL obligations because such norms are 
binding on all States independent of their ratification of a specific treaty con-
42 Ibid. at para. 59 [emphasis added].
43 Ibid. at para. 80 [emphasis added].
44 Kretzmer, supra note 29 at 184.
45 Ibid. at 184-85.
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taining the rule. As such, it may be argued that a State must abide by its peremp-
tory IHRL obligations when it exercises counter-terrorist force (i.e., a projection 
of its power) in the territory of the other State.
B. The Application of International Humanitarian Law
 At its core, IHL is a compromise that seeks to balance military necessity with 
the desire to protect humanity from the devastation of armed conflict.46 The 
result is a legal regime that seeks a “middle road” that gives States involved in 
armed conflicts leeway to inflict destruction when it is militarily necessary, while 
their freedom of action is circumscribed in the name of humanitarianism.47 Re-
strictions on the methods and means of warfare have existed for much of human 
history.48 Evolving from medieval times to the present, the concept of “just war” 
in which any means were permissible provided that the cause was just gave way 
to a privileged class of belligerents, and finally a relatively high level of protection 
for civilians today.49 The progressive codification of IHL gradually achieved this 
protection and placed limits on the conduct of hostilities in response to the hor-
rors of war.50 The modern bases for legal protection for individuals who do not 
or can no longer take part in fighting is found in the four 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions for the Protection of War Victims [Geneva Conventions], which enjoy univer-
sal acceptance.51 In 1977, two Additional Protocols [API and APII] were added 
46 See Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) (“[IHL] in its entirety is predicated on a subtle 
equilibrium between two diametrically opposed impulses: military necessity and humanitarian 
considerations. If military necessity were to prevail completely, no limitation of any kind 
would have been imposed on the freedom of action between belligerent States…. Conversely, 
if benevolent humanitarianism were the only beacon to guide the path of armed forces, war 
would have entailed no bloodshed, no destruction and no human suffering; in short, war would 
not be war”) at 16.
47 Ibid. (Such concern was first codified in the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration: “the progress of 
civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war” at 9,) 
at 17.
48 See e.g. Green supra note 57.
49 See Judith Gail Gardam, “Proportionality and Force in International Law” (1993) 87 A.J.I.L. 
395, and Kenneth Watkin, “Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents and Conflicts in the 21st 
Century” Background Paper (Harvard University: Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict 
Research, 2003) at 6.
50 The Hague II convention of 1899 is an early manifestation of such protection, as it prohibited 
the bombardment of undefended settlements; see Convention with Respect to the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, 29 July 1899 (The Avalon Project, Yale Law School), online: <http://
avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/hague02.asp> [Hague II], art. 25. World Wars I and II were 
particularly important in this respect, as the involvement of entire societies in the war effort gave 
rise to the concept of the “total war” which was used to justify making non-combatants objects 
of attack and led to bombardment of cities with an intention of terrorizing the population and 
breaking their support for the war, see e.g., J. Marshall Beier, “Discriminating Tastes: ‘Smart’ 
Bombs, Non-Combatants, and Notions of Legitimacy in Warfare” (2003) 34 Security Dialogue 
418.
51 Highlighting the concern with persons who do not take part in hostilities is Geneva Convention 
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 
[Geneva Convention IV]. Regarding ratification of the Geneva Conventions, see ICRC, The 
Geneva Conventions: The Core of International Humanitarian Law, online: ICRC <http://www.
icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/genevaconventions>.
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to the Geneva Conventions, which address issues arising under international and 
non-international armed conflicts respectively and complement rather than 
supercede the Geneva Conventions.52 Although the Protocols do not enjoy uni-
versal ratification some of their content reflects customary international law.53
 It should be noted that there is debate regarding the ability of IHL to regulate 
an armed conflict that occurs between a State and a non-State actor based in 
the territory of another State.54 Rather than examining this debate, this article 
will evaluate the legality of targeted strikes against suspected terrorists under 
the assumption that IHL would apply when the general conditions of an armed 
conflict are met.55 Although subject to debate, these conditions include: i) iden-
tifiable parties that maintain a minimal level of organization; ii) an identifi-
able territory in which the conflict takes place; iii) armed violence exceeding 
the requisite threshold; and iv) the beginning and end of the conflict must be 
identifiable (or capable of future identification).56
52 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [API]; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [APII].
53 See ICRC, Geneva Conventions, ibid. (168 States have ratified API and 164 States have ratified 
APII); regarding customary status, see Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., 
Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
54 See e.g. Geoffrey S. Corn, “Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to 
Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict” (2007) 40 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 295; Marco 
Sassoli, “Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law” Occasional Paper 
Series No. 6 (Harvard University: Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, 
2006); Roy Schondorf, “Extra-State Armed Conflicts: Is There a Need for a New Legal 
Regime?” (2004) 37 N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1; Derek Jinks, “September 11 and the Laws of 
War” (2003) Y.J. Int’l L. 1; Gabor Rona, “Interesting Times for International Humanitarian 
Law: Challenges from the ‘War on Terror’” (2003) 27 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 55. For a 
discussion in the context of transnational terrorism, see Karinne Coombes, “Protecting Civilians 
during the Fight Against Transnational Terrorism: Applying International Humanitarian Law 
to Transnational Armed Conflicts” (2008) 46 Can. Y. B. Int’l Law 241.
55 It should also be noted that armed conflicts have been divided into two categories—international 
(State-to-State) and non-international (internal)—to which different rules apply. There has been 
a significant degree of convergence between these rules over time; see e.g., Theodore Meron, 
“Cassese’s Tadic and the Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts” in Lal Chand Vorah et al, 
eds., Man’s Inhumanity to Man: Essays in Honour of Antonio Cassese (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2003) (As a result of the jurisprudence of the ICTY, “there has been a broadening 
of international law applicable to non-international armed conflicts, often through elimination 
of the distinctions between international and non-international armed conflicts” at 536). Given 
this trend of convergence, the ICRC undertook a comprehensive study of customary IHL, 
producing an authoritative treatise on the subject; see Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 
53. The study’s findings are extremely relevant to identifying the protections IHL affords to 
civilians, as many of these rules have been recognized as customary law applicable to both 
international and non-international armed conflicts. Since the rules this article will focus on are 
applicable to both categories of armed conflict, the distinction between the two categories, and 
the potential difficulty in classifying an armed conflict between a State and a non-State actor 
based in another State as one category or the other will not be addressed in this article; for a 
discussion of these issues see citations ibid.
56 For a discussion of these criteria in the context of transnational terrorism, see Rona, supra note 
54 at 55-74. See also, Prosecutor v. Tadic (Jurisdiction) (“an armed conflict exists whenever there 
is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental 
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 An important aspect of IHL is its binding nature on all parties to a conflict, ir-
respective of the cause and regardless of whether war has been declared or recog-
nized by any of the parties.57 IHL also applies equally to all parties to a conflict, 
independent of the legality of the recourse to the use of force,58 and remains ef-
fective even if a party denounces its application.59 Furthermore, non-adherence 
to IHL cannot justify in-kind reprisals.60 As such, if IHL applied to an armed 
conflict between a State and a non-State actor in the context of transnational 
terrorism, its provisions would bind both the State and non-State actor, and the 
State would be unable to deny the application of IHL simply by arguing that the 
non-State actor’s unlawful terrorist attacks instigated the conflict.
C. International Humanitarian Law as Lex Specialis
 Although the application of IHL is confined to armed conflicts and IHRL is 
generally understood as affecting State action in times of peace, Kenneth Wat-
kin notes that, “the dividing line between the operation of... [IHL] and human 
rights law is not always clear or absolute,” and “the relationship between the two 
is much more complex than this simple division of responsibilities implies.”61 
Concern for humanity is an underlying feature of both IHRL and IHL. In light 
of this common concern, IHRL has played a significant role in the development 
of the substantive provisions of IHL.62 Despite this interaction, major differ-
authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State” at paras. 67 and 
70).
57 Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, 3d ed. (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2008) at 53.
58 See e.g., Dinstein, supra note 46 (“Breaches of [IHL] cannot be justified on the ground that 
the enemy is responsible for commencing the hostilities in flagrant breach of the jus ad bellum” 
at 5); Gerald L. Neuman, “Humanitarian Law and Counterterrorist Force” (2003) E.J.I.L. 
283 at 284. See especially API, supra note 52 (“The provisions of the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949 and this Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons 
who are protected by those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature 
or origin of the armed conflict or the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties of the 
conflict”, preamble). Although IHL applies to all parties in a conflict, this is not to say that the 
obligations on the State will always be identical. In certain circumstances, IHL obligations may 
vary to a degree between parties to the same conflict (e.g., when a State has ratified the Ottawa 
Convention banning the use of land mines but another State has not and it continues to use 
them without violating IHL).
59 See Green, supra note 57 at 23.
60 See e.g. Marco Sassoli & Antoine A. Bouvier, eds. 2d ed. How Does Law Protect in War? (Geneva: 
ICRC, 2006) (When a State takes countermeasures against another State for a breach of an 
international obligation, “[t]hose measures must themselves conform to IHL…” while reprisals 
against protected persons and the civilian population by parties to a conflict are prohibited at 
297). 
61 Kenneth Watkin, “Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in 
Contemporary Armed Conflict” (2004) 98 A.J.I.L. 1 at 2. 
62 See e.g. Theodor Meron, Humanization of International Law (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2006) (“Human rights law has influenced the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and of 
the Additional Protocols. Parallelism of content was attained in such matters as: right to life; 
prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest 
or detention; discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, language or religion; and due process 
of law” at 45).
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ences between the two bodies of law persist due to IHL’s compromise between 
humanity and military necessity. As a result, IHL permits some actions during 
an armed conflict that would otherwise violate IHRL.
 Although IHL applies during an armed conflict, it does not completely dis-
place IHRL.63 The ICJ has confirmed the continued application of IHRL during 
armed conflicts although it may be altered by the application of IHL. In the 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the ICJ considered the argument that the 
use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful because it would violate the right to 
life guaranteed by Article 6 of the ICCPR.64 The Court rejected the claim that 
such a violation would not be possible because nuclear weapons would only be 
used during an armed conflict to which the ICCPR does not apply, as it held that 
IHRL would apply, but its substance would be influenced by IHL:
In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s 
life [per Article 6] applies also in hostilities. The test of what 
is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be 
determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law 
applicable in armed conflict, which is designed to regulate 
the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of 
life, through a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered 
an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 in the 
Covenant can only be decided by reference to the law applic-
able in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the 
Covenant itself.65
According to the lex specialis maxim, “when two laws apply to the same situation 
at the same time, the more specific or more ‘special’ law takes precedence over 
the other”66 to the extent they cannot concurrently apply. The effect of IHL as 
lex specialis is that its specific rules will supercede those of IHRL when the two 
bodies of law apply directly and contradictorily to the same issue, while the 
principles of IHRL would apply when IHL does not address an aspect of an 
armed conflict.67 Although a thorough survey of how IHRL and IHL interact is 
63 In 1970, the UNGA recognized the “dual application” of IHL and IHRL, noting that, 
“fundamental human rights, as accepted in international law and laid down by international 
instruments, continue to apply fully in situations of armed conflict”; see Basic Principles for 
the Protection of Civilian Populations in Armed Conflicts, GA Res. 2675 (XXV), UN Doc. A/
RES/2675 (1970).
64 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] I.C.J. Rep. 226 at 
para. 25 [Nuclear Weapons].
65 Ibid.
66 Natasha Balendra, “Defining Armed Conflict” (2008) 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2461 at 2464.
67 See Construction of a Wall, supra note 39 (The Court recognized three potential situations: (i) 
where IHRL applies; (ii) where IHL applies; and, (iii) where both IHL and IHRL apply at 
para. 106). For a detailed discussion of the “fragmentation” or international law and the lex 
specialis maxim, see ILC, “Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law”, 58th Sess., UN Doc. A/61/10 (2006), online: United Nations Treaty Collection <http://
untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/1_9_2006.pdf>.
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not possible in this work, it should be noted that there is a strong argument to 
be made that the existence of an armed conflict should be construed narrowly 
because IHL may provide less protection for individual rights than IHRL.68 
Natasha Balendra argues that IHL may be considered an “exception” to IHRL 
in such circumstances, and that IHL should be interpreted in a manner that 
minimizes the “derogation” from IHRL.69
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF INNOCENT 
CIVILIANS
A. The Protection of Civilians under International Human Rights Law
 When a person dies as a result of State action, the question arises whether the 
use of lethal force by the State was justified or if it violated the individual’s right 
to life, which “is unquestionably one of the most basic or fundamental human 
rights.”70 The right to life was recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and was subsequently codified in all major international human rights 
treaties.71 Clearly, any State that is a party to such a treaty would be obliged to 
respect the right to life. Even if a State were not party to such an agreement, 
however, it would likely still be bound to respect the right to life because it has 
been widely recognized as a fundamental right guaranteed for all persons.72 Kurt 
Herndl argues that the right to life is a peremptory norm of international law:
Of all the norms of international law, the right to life must 
surely rank as the most basic and fundamental, a primordial 
right which inspires and informs all other rights, from which 
the latter obtain their raison d’etre and must take their lead. 
Protection against arbitrary deprivation of life must be con-
sidered as an imperative norm of international law, which 
means not only that it is binding irrespective of whether or 
not States have subscribed to international conventions con-
taining guarantees of the right, but also that the non-derog-
68 See e.g. Balendra, supra note 66 at 2464.
69 Ibid. at 2464-66.
70 Noëlle Quénivet, “The Right to Life in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law” in Roberta Arnold & Noëlle Quénivet, eds, International Humanitarian Law and Human 
Rights Law: Towards a New Merger in International Law (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 331 
at 331; Watkin, supra note 61 (“When the right to life is deprived, it is impossible to enjoy any 
fundamental freedom” at 9).
71 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., UN Doc. 
A/810 (1948) 71 (“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person”, art. 3). See, 
e.g., ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 6(1); ECHR, supra note 26, art. 2; American Convention, supra 
note 26, art. 4; African Charter, supra note 26, art. 4.
72 See e.g., Noëlle Quénivet, supra note 70 at 331; Alex P. Schmid, “Terrorism and Human Rights: 
A Perspective from the United Nations” in Magnus Ranstorp & Paul Wilkinson, eds., Terrorism 
and Human Rights (New York: Routledge, 2008) 19 at 19-20. There is a strong argument that 
States are bound to respect some human rights even when their activities are directed at and 
affect individuals outside of the State’s territory, see supra section III.A.
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ability of the right to life has a peremptory character at all 
times, circumstances and situations.73
The UN Commission on Human Rights supports the view that the right to life 
is a peremptory norm of international law, noting in General Comment No. 29 
that:
The proclamation of certain provisions of the [ICCPR] as 
being of a non-derogable nature, in article 4, paragraph 2, 
is to be seen partly as recognition of the peremptory nature 
of some fundamental rights ensured in treaty form in the 
Covenant (e.g., articles 6 [the right to life] and 7 [the right to 
be free of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment].74
In light of its importance, a State would likely be bound to respect the right to 
life when it uses extra-territorial force against the threat of transnational terror-
ism because “[a] state’s duty to respect the right to life… follows its agents wher-
ever they operate.”75 As Nils Melzer, legal advisor to the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross [ICRC] concludes, “the obligation to ‘respect’ the right to 
life is also a peremptory norm of general international law and, as such, is bind-
ing upon all States at all times and in all places.” Despite the fact that it may be 
at odds with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Bankovic, 
Melzer draws a distinction between the State’s obligation to respect and to pro-
tect the right to life and concludes that, “where the deliberate infringement of 
the right to life is involved, even marginal or punctual exercise of power may give 
rise to extraterritorial ‘jurisdiction’ of the action State, albeit only with regard to 
the precise act and to the individuals affected.”76 He argues that a State with the 
ability to undertake a targeted strike “will also exercise sufficient factual control 
to assume legal responsibility” for any failure to respect the right to life, while the 
concept of actual control of the person or territory in question would be relevant 
to determining if the State is bound to actively protect the right to life.77
 Despite its peremptory nature, the right to life is not unlimited. Most inter-
national human rights treaties reflect this limitation by expressly prohibiting 
the “arbitrary deprivation” of the right.78 Many human rights can be subject 
to derogation in limited circumstances, such as a “time of war or other public 
73 Kurt Herndl, “Forward” in B.G. Ramcharan, ed., The Right to Life in International Law (Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1985) at xi.
74 General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), UN HRCOR, 72nd Sess., 1950th 
Mtg., UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001) at para. 11.
75 Kretzmer, supra note 29 at 185.
76 Melzer, supra note 10 at 138.
77 Ibid. at 138-39.
78 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 53 at 313 (emphasis added). The ECHR does 
not contain the word “arbitrary”, but limits the lawful denial of the right to lift to specific 
enumerated circumstances, see infra, section III.
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emergency threatening the life of the nation.”79 Derogation, however, is “the 
exception and is always limited,” as a State must show that “a public emer-
gency exists which threatens the life of the nation and must officially proclaim its 
existence.”80 Although the right to life protects individuals from only “arbitrary” 
killings, it is considered non-derogable81 and therefore remains protected at all 
times. State practice has established the right to life as a rule of customary inter-
national law applicable during armed conflicts.82 As such, unless an individual’s 
death as a result of State action can be justified under IHRL and/or IHL, it 
would constitute an arbitrary deprivation of the right to life.83 Given that States 
are bound to respect the right to life at all times, it may offer significant protec-
tion to innocent civilians during the counter-terrorist use of force by States.84
B. IHL and the Protection of Civilians during Armed Conflicts
 One of the underlying humanitarian features of IHL is the concern with the 
protection of individuals who take no part in the conduct of hostilities, which 
has progressively developed to such an extent that the UNHRC has found that, 
“the protection of civilians is a fundamental precept of IHL.”85 Customary IHL 
recognizes as civilians “all persons who are not members of the armed forces,” 
while the “civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians.”86 There 
are numerous principles under IHL that protect innocent civilians, including 
the principles of distinction and proportionality, and the requirement to take 
precautions in attack. Given this article’s focus on the legality of targeted kill-
ings of suspected terrorists, only the principle of distinction under IHL will be 
discussed.
 The principle of distinction applies as customary IHL87 and requires States 
79 Jean-Marie Henckaerts, “Concurrent Application of International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights Law: A Victim’s Perspective” in Arnold & Quénivet, supra note 70, 253 at 258. 
80 Ibid. at 253.
81 See e.g. ibid. at 256-58; Schmid supra note 72 (“While states can derogate during an emergency 
certain human rights, like the freedom of association, there are rights which cannot be derogated, 
including the right to life” at 20).
82 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 53 at 311-14 (Rule 80: “Murder is prohibited” at 311; 
“In their statements before the [ICJ]… several States which were not at the time party to the 
main human rights treaties stressed the elementary and non-derogable character of the right to 
life” at 313).
83 This limitation on the right to life will be explored in more detail below in section 4.1.
84 Although other human rights (such as the right to due process of the law) may be threatened 
through counter-terrorist activities, this article will limit its consideration of human rights 
implications to the right to life because of the focus on protecting innocent civilians.
85 Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon UN HRC, 
3d Sess., UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/3/3 (2006) at para. 82.
86 This definition applies to both international and non-international armed conflicts, although the 
ICRC has noted that State practice “is ambiguous as to whether members of armed opposition 
groups are considered members of armed forces or civilians” during non-international conflicts 
(Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 53 at 17, “rule 5”).
87 The principle applies to both international and non-international armed conflicts; see 
Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 53 “rule 1” at 3. This customary status has been 
recognized by the ICJ and other international tribunals: Nuclear Weapons, supra note 64 at 
paras. 61 and 434; see ibid., note 35.
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to, as much as is feasible, ensure that the “effects of war [are] limited to combat-
ants and military objectives.”88 The modern principle of distinction provides 
that, “[t]he parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians 
and combatants,” while “[a]ttacks may only be directed against combatants,” 
and “must not be directed against civilians.”89 The principle of distinction also 
protects civilians from the adverse effects of hostilities by requiring States to 
distinguish between civilian “objects” and military objectives.90 A lawful mil-
itary objective must: (i) be tangible; (ii) contribute effectively to the military 
action of the enemy by its “nature, location, purpose or use;” and, (iii) offer a 
definite military advantage if destroyed, captured or neutralized.91 These criteria 
must be fulfilled “in the circumstances ruling at the time.”92 Through this re-
quirement, Marco Sassoli argues that the drafters of API “avoid[ed] too large an 
interpretation” of the lawful objects of attack and thereby “exclud[ed] indirect 
contributions and possible advantages.”93 Without these restrictions, he argues 
that, “the limitation to ‘military’ objectives [and thereby the protection afforded 
to civilians by the principle of distinction] could be too easily undermined.”94 
In addition to being considered unlawful targets of attack, civilians also enjoy 
protection from the effects of indiscriminate attacks.95
88 Rona, supra note 54 at 66.
89 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 53 “rule 1” at 3 (Although the authors do not clearly 
state this in Rule 1, it is qualified by the fact that civilians who are directly participating in 
hostilities may be lawful targets of attack.)
90 The requirement to restrict attacks to military objectives, which is customary law applicable to 
international and non-international armed conflicts, was codified in API; see API, supra note 52 
(Art. 48 identifies the “basic rule”: “In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between 
the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and 
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives”). Regarding customary 
status, see Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, ibid., “rule 7” (Although a similar codification of this 
rule was dropped from the draft of APII prior to its acceptance, “it has been argued that the 
concept of general protection [of civilians] in Article 13(1) of [APII] is broad enough to cover 
it” in non-international armed conflicts. Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck support the conclusion 
that the principle of distinction applies in non-international armed conflicts with reference 
to treaties dealing with the conduct of hostilities during non-international armed conflicts 
concluded after APII, numerous military manuals, national legislation, State practice, and the 
Nuclear Weapons case at 25, 27-28).
91 API, ibid., art. 52(2). This understanding of military objectives also reflects customary 
international law applicable to international and non-international armed conflicts; see 
Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, ibid., “rule 8” at 29-32.
92 API, ibid., art. 52(2).
93 Marco Sassoli, “Legitimate Targets of Attack under IHL” Background Paper (Harvard University: 
Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, 2004) at 3 [emphasis in original].
94 Ibid.
95 API, supra note 52 (The Protocol expressly prohibits indiscriminate attacks and identifies, but 
does not limit, such attacks as: “(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; 
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific 
military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which 
cannot be limited as required by [the] Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a 
nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction”, art. 
51(4)); see Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 53 (The Mexico delegation stated that 
art. 51 “cannot be the subject of any reservations whatsoever since these would be inconsistent 
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C. The Challenge of Asymmetrical Conflicts
 A conflict between a State and a non-State actor is almost always asymmetrical 
in nature, with the State enjoying a significant military advantage. In such situa-
tions, it is common for the disadvantaged party to employ tactics to overcome 
its disadvantage. Terrorist attacks are often characterized as such a tactic; since 
the group cannot prevail over the State militarily, it seeks to gain an advantage 
by targeting the vulnerable civilian population. Although the militarily dis-
advantaged party will likely breach IHL, this does not—and, it is argued, should 
not—excuse the other party from respecting its obligations under IHL.96
 Aside from directing attacks at civilians, non-State actors may use other tactics 
that breach IHL. Common tactics include “[t]he asymmetrically disadvantaged 
party either feign[ing] protected status or us[ing] proximity to protected individ-
uals and objects to deter attacks.”97 By concealing themselves within the civilian 
population, this practice arguably “turns the IHL principle of distinction on its 
head by incentivising its violation.”98 The danger these tactics pose to civilians 
and the challenge they present to States responding to them is illustrated by the 
tactic of “human shielding,” which occurs when a party attempts to protect its 
position from attack by deliberately placing civilians in the line of fire. Human 
shielding is clearly contrary to IHL.99 Although a party may benefit from its 
breach of IHL, civilians being used as involuntary shields are not lawful targets 
of direct attack and must be included in the proportionality considerations by a 
party planning to attack.100
 It is readily apparent that the tactics employed by a non-State terrorist group 
can challenge the ability for States to effectively respond to the threat they pose. 
It is argued that this difficulty does not and should not legitimize breaches of 
IHL and IHRL in the name of counter-terrorism, because accepting the con-
with the aim and purpose of Protocol I and undermine its basis” at 41). The prohibition on 
indiscriminate attacks is customary law applicable to international and non-international armed 
conflicts; see Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 53, “rule 12” at 40.
96 See e.g. API, supra note 52 (“Any violation of these prohibitions shall not release the Parties to 
the conflict from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian population and civilians” at 
art. 51(8)).
97 Michael N. Schmitt, “Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law” in Wolff 
Heintschel von Heinegg & Volker Epping, eds., International Humanitarian Law Facing New 
Challenges: Symposium in Honour of Knut Ipsen (New York: Springer, 2007) 11 at 23.
98 Ibid. at 22.
99 Human shielding is prohibited in international and non-international armed conflicts under 
customary IHL; see Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 53 at 337-40, “rule 97”.
100 This does not mean that a State will be automatically barred from attacking the object being 
shielded. Involuntary human shields must be factored into the proportionality consideration; 
if the target is a valid military objective, it may be possible for the State to attack it and not 
violate IHL as long as the resulting civilian casualties are not disproportionate to the valid 
military objective sought. Voluntary human shields would be lawful targets of attack because 
their activities constitute direct participation in hostilities. As Michael N. Schmitt notes, 
“[t]here have been suggestions that involuntary shields should not be included in the calculation 
of incidental injury, lest the lawbreakers benefit from their misconduct:” see Schmitt, supra note 
97 at 27. This argument should not be accepted because it clearly contradicts the principle 
that violations of IHL do not release the other party of its legal obligations and could severely 
undermine the protections the law provides to innocent civilians.
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trary may threaten the rights of innocent civilians and the rule of law itself.101 
The rigours of the law should not be relaxed due to the difficulty of combating 
an asymmetrically disadvantaged party because accepting otherwise could lead 
down a slippery slope toward eroding the protection that innocent civilians have 
progressively attained during and outside of armed conflicts.
V. TARGETED KILLINGS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
 With the realization of the increased threat posed by transnational terror-
ism, a debate has arisen regarding the appropriate manner in which the threat 
should be addressed. At its core, terrorism remains a criminal act under domestic 
and international law, which supports the argument that, in non-armed conflict 
situations, law enforcement is the appropriate means to combat the threat by 
preventing and deterring terrorists through apprehension and criminal prosecu-
tion. When, however, a State uses extra-territorial force to address the threat 
of terrorism, an argument may arise that it is appropriate for IHL to apply. As 
noted above, however, IHL only applies during armed conflicts; as such, the 
legality of so-called “targeted killings” outside of times of armed conflict must be 
determined according to other legal regimes.
 Using lethal force against suspected terrorists through targeted killings has 
been a growing tactic of States in their attempt to protect their civilians from 
the threat of transnational terrorism.102 Gabor Rona questions the legality of this 
practice:
[Targeted killing is] of dubious legality… for several reasons. 
First, unless the event is part of an armed conflict, humanitar-
ian law does not apply, and its provisions recognizing a priv-
ilege to kill may not be invoked. The event must be analyzed 
under other applicable legal regimes. Second, even if humani-
tarian law applies, the legality of the attack is questionable be-
cause the targets were not directly participating in hostilities 
at the time they were killed, and because the attackers’ right 
to engage in combat is doubtful.103
This part will explore the legality of targeted killings through the framework 
of the law enforcement and armed conflict models. As seen above, IHRL will 
101 Ibid. (“when asymmetry disrupts the presumption [that the parties to an armed conflict will 
abide by the rules of IHL] and one side violates the agreed rules, the practical incentive for 
compliance by the other fades. Instead, IHL begins appearing as if it operates to the benefit of 
one’s foes. When that happens, the dictates of the law appear out of step with reality, perhaps 
even ‘quaint’…. [T]he real danger is not so much that the various forms of asymmetry will 
result in violations of IHL. Rather, it is that asymmetries may unleash a dynamic that undercuts 
the very foundations of this body of law” at 47-48).
102 For e.g. Israel adopted a policy of “targeted killings” of suspected terrorists in response to the 
second intifada in 2000; the U.S. conducted strikes against suspected terrorists in Yemen in 
2001 and Syria in 2008, and continues to target suspected terrorists in Pakistan.
103 Rona, supra note 54 at 65. Direct participation will be discussed infra, section V.B.
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have a role in regulating the State’s use of lethal force under the law enforcement 
model, while IHL will apply during an armed conflict. Of primary importance 
under IHL is determining the status of non-State actors as civilians or combat-
ants, as this affects the ability of States to lawfully use lethal force and may act as 
a disincentive for individuals to participate in an armed conflict.
A. Targeted Killings Under International Human Rights Law104
 As explored above, a fundamental principle of IHRL is that a person cannot 
be arbitrarily deprived of the right to life, which arguably applies as a peremptory 
norm when a State uses force (i.e., exercises its power on a person) outside of the 
context of an armed conflict.105 In order to determine the lawfulness of targeted 
killings under IHRL in contexts that do not amount to an armed conflict, it is 
necessary to explore when such action would not be considered “arbitrary.”106 
The limitations to the right to life found in article 2(2) of the ECHR may illus-
trate when targeted killings breach IHRL:
Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in con-
travention of this article when it results from the use of force 
which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence 
of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect 
a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained; or (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of 
quelling a riot or insurrection.
Setting aside other legal issues that could encumber a State’s use of force in 
the territory of another State, David Kretzmer argues that targeted killings may 
be lawful under IHRL if they meet the proportionality test contained in this 
Article.107 Applying this test, a State’s extra-territorial use of lethal force against 
a suspected terrorist may be lawful under IHRL if the action is: (i) absolutely 
necessary; and, (ii) in defence of the civilian population that is being targeted for 
a terrorist attack. The European Court of Human Rights has strictly interpreted 
the requirement of absolute necessity.108 Accordingly, two conditions must be 
satisfied. First, no other measures—such as apprehension of the suspected terror-
104 This article will focus only on the potential legality of targeted killings under IHRL, although 
there are clearly other legal regimes that would apply to the State’s use of extra-territorial armed 
force, including jus ad bellum.
105 See discussion above, section III.A.
106 Although not central to this discussion, a second fundamental right is the right to due process 
of law. Targeted killings risk denying this right to individuals suspected of terrorist acts, and they 
may be considered subject to summary execution in violation of their right to life. Reflecting 
such concerns, targeted killings are often referred to as “extra-judicial execution”, and it is argued 
that such killings amount to an arbitrary deprivation of the right to life because of the lack of 
due process; see Kretzmer, supra note 29 (extra-judicial execution “implies that the relevant 
law is a law-enforcement model and the applicable regime to assess state action is international 
human rights law” at 176).
107 Ibid. at 177.
108 See e.g., McCann et al. v. The United Kingdom, [1995] ECHR 31 (“force used must be 
proportionate to the achievement of the aims” set out in article 2(2) at para. 149); see ibid. 
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ists—could be used to protect the threatened persons.109 Second, even when no 
other measures are available, it must be necessary to use lethal force rather than a 
lesser degree of force.110 Failing to meet these requirements, a State’s use of lethal 
force against a suspected terrorist outside of an armed conflict would breach its 
IHRL obligations: “Any intentional use of lethal force by state authorities that is 
not justified under the provisions regarding the right to life will, by definition, 
be regarded as an ‘extra-judicial execution.’”111 In the context of transnational 
terrorism, it is conceivable that the use of lethal force against suspected terrorists 
could be lawful: “relying solely on the duty of the victim state under [IHRL] 
to respect the right to life, could it not argue that it has no choice but to resort 
to force against the suspected terrorist? That force was absolutely necessary to 
protect its civilians against unlawful violence?”112
 In an effort to maintain the protection of innocent civilians, it is argued that 
a State should be required to respect the right to life—as a peremptory norm—
when it targets suspected terrorists abroad. As noted above, it could be argued 
that a State is only bound by its IHRL obligations when its use of extra-territor-
ial force amounts to an exercise of “effective control” over the territory in ques-
tion and a targeted killing would not reach this threshold. If sustained, such an 
argument would clearly lead to States having more freedom to engage in such 
tactics. It should be noted, however, that since a State engaging in targeted kill-
ings would likely be required to justify its extra-territorial use of force as self-de-
fence, it would be obliged to meet the requirements of jus ad bellum when using 
such force even if it were not bound by the absolute necessity requirements of 
IHRL.113 Although this would ensure that the action remains regulated by inter-
109 See Kretzmer, ibid (“Under the law enforcement model use of force can never be regarded as 
necessary… unless it is clear that there was no feasible possibility of protecting the prospective 
victim and apprehending the suspected perpetrator” at 179).
110 Ibid. at 178.
111 Ibid. at 176.
112 Ibid. at 179. See also Melzer, supra note 10 (He concludes that there may be situations where 
targeted strikes may be considered lawful; however, the requirements are stringent:
  “In order to be lawful under the international normative paradigm of law 
enforcement [i.e., outside of an armed conflict], a particular State-sponsored 
targeted killing must, cumulatively:
	 •		have	 a	 sufficient	 legal	 basis	 in	 domestic	 law,	 which	 regulates	 the	 use	 of	





achievement of this purpose;
	 •		be	the	undesired	ultima	ratio,	and	not	the	actual	aim,	of	an	operation	which	
is planned, prepared and conducted so as to minimize, to the greatest extent 
possible, the recourse to lethal force” at 423).
113 See Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 4th ed. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) (Dinstein considers such action “extra-territorial law enforcement.” 
In circumstances where another State “permits the use of its territory as a staging area for 
terrorist attacks when it could shut those operations down, and refuses to take action” he 
argues that, “the host government cannot expect to insulate its territory against measures of 
self-defense.” He concludes that the State seeking to take action is required to first offer its 
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national law, this article argues that the status of the right to life as a peremptory 
norm supports finding that a State is obliged to respect this right when it engages 
in the practice of targeted killings, as this action may be understood as an exer-
cise of the State’s power over the person, and the State would have been obliged 
to respect this right if the person targeted were located in its territory. This argu-
ment is strengthened by considering the result in situations where the territorial 
State B (openly or privately) consents or acquiesces to, or even requests, State 
A’s strike: by its consent or acquiescence, State B may explicitly or implicitly au-
thorize what would have constituted a breach of IHRL if State B had itself used 
such force; or, it could attempt to avoid its obligations under IHRL entirely by 
secretly requesting the action. This situation would clearly erode the protection 
afforded by the right to life. In light of the absolute necessity requirement under 
IHRL, it is argued that a State would only be able to lawfully engage in targeted 
strikes where it has strong evidence of the identity of the suspected terrorist and 
the specific threat the individual poses to the State’s population. Further, such ac-
tion would only be absolutely necessary if, and when, the territorial State proves 
unwilling or unable to take action against the suspected terrorist. Otherwise, 
State A would not be able to show that it was unable to use less forceful means 
to combat the terrorist threat. Investigations may also be required after such a 
strike to determine the legality of the action, and compensation paid to victims 
if the act amounts to a gross violation of IHRL.114 Although a complete analysis 
of the legality of targeted strikes outside of armed conflicts is beyond the scope of 
assistance to remove the terrorist threat, and if the host State refuses the offer of assistance and 
proves unwilling to act when it has the capacity to do so, it “must be prepared to bear certain 
unpleasant consequences,” including the use of force in its territory by the other State. Dinstein 
argues that this extra-territorial law enforcement action may be justified because the injured 
State “is entitled to enforce international law extra-territorially if and when [the host State] 
is unable or unwilling to prevent repetition of the armed attack.” Under this model, the State 
would be obliged to satisfy the traditional requirements of using force in self-defence, including 
being a prior victim of an armed attack: “The necessity to infringe upon [the host State’s] 
sovereignty has to be manifest. The forcible measures employed… must be reactive to an 
attack already committed by hostile armed bands or terrorists, and not only anticipatory 
of what is no more than a future attack…. Additionally, a repetition of the attack has to be 
expected, so that the extra-territorial law enforcement can qualify as defensive and not 
purely punitive. The absence of alternative means for putting an end to the operations of 
the armed bands or terrorists has to be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt” [emphasis 
added] at 245-47). Despite Dinstein’s argument, it is unclear if terrorist attacks committed by 
an armed group that are not attributable to a State would satisfy the requirement of an “armed 
attack” for the purposes of invoking the State’s right to use armed force in the territory of the 
territorial State in self-defence; see Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), [2005] I.C.J. Rep. 5 at paras. 143-47 (The Court 
“ha[d] no need to respond to the contentions... as to whether and under what conditions 
contemporary international law provides for a right of self-defence against large-scale attacks by 
irregular forces” at para. 147); see also Tatiana Waisburg, “Colombia’s Use of Force in Ecuador 
Against a Terrorist Organization: International Law and the Use of Force Against Non-State 
Actors”ASIL Insights (22 August 2008), ASIL online: American Society of International Law 
<http://www.asil.org/insights080822.cfm>.
114 See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, GA Res. 60/147, UN GAOR 60th Sess. UN Doc. A/Res/60/147 (2006).
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this article, the apparent willingness of some States to engage in this practice—
with and without the apparent consent of the territorial State—ensures that the 
legality of such acts will remain an important and highly contested issue.
B. Targeted Killings Under International Humanitarian Law
1. The Status of Individual Terrorists: Combatants or Civilians?
 As seen above, IHL affords significant protection to civilians during times of 
armed conflict. This protection, however, is limited. Under IHL, when civilians 
participate in an armed conflict, they lose their protection from being lawful tar-
gets of attack. When civilians lose this protection has been the subject of vigorous 
debate in the context of transnational terrorism.115 Although civilians lose their 
protected status by directly participating in hostilities, they do not automatic-
ally become “combatants” for the purposes of IHL. The Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocols define combatant status in the context of international 
(i.e., State-to-State) armed conflicts.116 Combatants in such conflicts have the 
specific right to participate directly in hostilities, and enjoy the protections of a 
prisoner-of-war [POW] if they fall into the hands of the opposing party.117 To 
promote the protection of civilians, combatants are generally required to distin-
guish themselves from the civilian population; therefore, persons failing to meet 
these requirements would not be considered combatants under IHL.118 During 
non-international armed conflicts, the armed forces of a State that is party to 
an armed conflict are considered combatants for the purposes of distinction. As 
combatants, members of the armed forces are lawful targets of attack and have 
the right to engage in hostilities without the risk of prosecution for actions that 
remain within the bounds of IHL because such acts would not be contrary to 
115 See Targeted Killings, supra note 4 at paras. 31-40 and the authorities referred to therein; see 
also ICRC, “Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation under International 
Humanitarian Law” (2008) 90 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 991 [ICRC, “Direct Participation”].
116 See API, supra note 52 (“combatants” are members of the armed forces of a party to a conflict 
(other than medical personnel and chaplains), who “have the right to directly participate in 
hostilities”, art. 43(2)).
117 Ibid., arts. 43(2) and 44(1); see Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 53 (Prisoner of war 
status does not exist in non-international armed conflicts at 395).
118 There is a contested exception to this requirement where the nature of the hostilities prevent 
combatants from distinguishing themselves; see API, supra note 52, art. 44(3) (“Even in such 
circumstances, combatants are required to carry their arms openly during: (a) each military 
engagement, and (b) such time as the combatant is visible to the adversary while the combatant 
is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which the combatant 
is to participate”, art. 44(3); however, this “is not intended to change the generally accepted 
practice of States with respect to the wearing of the uniform by combatants assigned to the 
regular, uniformed armed units of a Party to the conflict”, art. 44(4)). This restriction applies 
as customary law to international armed conflicts; see Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 
53 at 384, “rule 106” (Although they lose their entitlement to POW status upon capture and 
related benefits of combatancy, combatants who fail to distinguish themselves are still entitled 
to the fundamental guarantees of customary IHL applicable during armed conflict, including 
the right to a fair trial: “Combatants must distinguish themselves from the civilian population 
while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack. If they 
fail to do so, they do not have the right of prisoner-of-war status”, “rule 100” at 389).
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domestic law. The situation with respect to non-State actors is unclear because 
they cannot be considered armed forces of a State.119 The ICRC has recently 
recommended an interpretation of IHL that would dispel some of the uncer-
tainty regarding non-State actors without granting them traditional combatancy 
status: “In non-international armed conflict, organized armed groups constitute 
the armed forces of a non-State party to the conflict and consist only of individ-
uals whose continuous function is to take a direct part in hostilities.”120 Historic-
ally, the denial of combatant status to non-State actors party to an armed conflict 
with a State is predicated on the unwillingness of States to accord legitimacy to 
such groups by recognizing their status as “lawful” combatants.121 Without such 
status, non-State actors cannot claim POW status if apprehended (during an 
international armed conflict), cannot lawfully engage in combat, and may be 
liable for prosecution as a result of their participation.122
 The question remains whether, and when, non-State actors engaged in an 
armed conflict with a State may be lawfully targeted.123 It is generally accepted 
that there are two legal statuses of persons under IHL: civilian or combatant.124 
Some commentators and States have argued that there should be a third category 
of “unlawful” or “unprivileged” combatants outside of the scope of IHL, who 
may be lawfully targeted for the duration of the conflict, but are not entitled 
to the benefits of combatancy.125 Sitting as the High Court of Justice, the Israel 
Supreme Court recently held that customary international and treaty law does 
not support this position.126 In light of the fact that such persons cannot be con-
sidered “combatants,” members of non-State terrorist organizations who engage 
119 See ibid (“[State] practice is not clear as to the situation of members of armed opposition 
groups. Practice does indicate, however, that persons do not enjoy the protection against attack 
accorded to civilians when they take a direct part in hostilities” at 12).
120 ICRC, “Direct Participation,” supra note 115 at 995 and 1006-09.
121  See e.g. Green, supra note 57.
122 Although not benefiting from combatancy status, such persons are not without protection 
under IHL. If in the power of the opposing party, such individuals would retain rights as 
persons hors de combat, which are protected as “fundamental guarantees” under customary IHL 
including the rights to humane treatment, not to be subject to torture, etc. See Henckaerts & 
Doswald-Beck, supra note 53 at 299 and on. Although the subject of the precise rights available 
to detained non-State actors who have engaged in hostilities with a State in the context of 
transnational terrorism is an important issue, it will not be examined in this article.
123 Confusion may arise regarding their legal status due to the use of the term “combatant” to 
describe such individuals; see e.g. Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 53 (“Persons 
taking a direct part in hostilities in non-international armed conflicts are sometimes labelled 
‘combatants’…. However, this designation is only used in its generic meaning and indicates that 
these persons do not enjoy the protection against attack accorded to civilians” at 12).
124 Targeted Killings, supra note 4.
125 See e.g. ibid. (“In the oral and written arguments before us, the State [of Israel] asked us to 
recognize a third category of persons, that of unlawful combatants. These are people who take 
active and continuous part in an armed conflict, and therefore should be treated as combatants, 
in the sense that they are legitimate targets of attack, and they do not enjoy the protections 
granted to civilians. However, they are not entitled to the rights and privileges of combatants, 
since they do not differentiate themselves from the civilian population, and since they do not 
obey the laws of war” at para. 11).
126 See ibid. at para. 28, citing Antonio Cassese, International Law, 2d (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005) at 408 and 470.
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in a conflict with a State may be best understood as civilians directly participat-
ing in hostilities,127 or, as the ICRC has recently recommended, members of 
the armed force of the non-State actor that is party to the conflict. Rather than 
being legally classified as an unprivileged combatant, only the person’s status as 
a unlawful target of attack is lost for the duration of their participation: “[such 
a person] is a civilian who is not protected from attack as long as he [or she] 
is taking a direct part in hostilities.”128 Following similar reasoning, the ICRC 
rejects the claim that there is a legal gap resulting in “a third category of persons 
affected by or involved in international armed conflict who are outside of IHL 
protection.”129
2. The Limited Nature of Civilian Status
 As noted above, civilians must refrain from directly participating in hostilities, 
or they will lose their protection from being targets of attack and cannot claim 
the privileges of combatancy.130 The requirement of the Additional Protocols 
that “[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by [the relevant provisions] 
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities,”131 is con-
sidered reflective of customary law.132 When direct participation in hostilities 
begins and ends is extremely important, as it will determine when States can 
lawfully target civilians—including non-State actors—who participate in an 
armed conflict.133 However, “direct participation” and “for such time” remain 
undefined.134 In light of the uncertainty, whether a person is a lawful target must 
be determined case-by-case;135 however, as discussed below, some general prin-
ciples may assist in making such determinations.136
127 See ibid. (They may be considered “uncivilized civilians” at para. 2, Vice President Rivlin, 
concurring).
128 Ibid. at para. 26.
129 ICRC 2003 Report, supra note 11 at 9.
130 Ibid. at 9-10.
131 API, supra note 52, art. 51(3) and APII, supra note 52, art. 13(3) [emphasis added].
132 This applies to both international and non-international armed conflicts; see Henckaerts & 
Doswald-Beck, supra note 53 at 20; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 51 (the protections of 
Common Article 3 apply to “persons taking no active part in hostilities,” art. 3); see Michael N. 
Schmitt, “‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ and 21st Century Hostilities” in Horst Fisher et al, 
eds., Crisis Management and Humanitarian Protection (Berlin: BWV, 2004) 505 at 523, online: 
Michael N. Schmitt <http://www.michaelschmitt.org/images/Directparticipationpageproofs.
pdf> (“Although Common Article 3 and Protocol II employ different terminology… the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has reasonably opined in the Akayesu judgment 
that the terms [“direct” and “active” participation] are so similar they should be treated 
synonymously” at 507).
133 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, ibid. at 21.
134 See Schmitt, “Direct Participation”, supra note 132 (“the nature of the requisite direct 
participation in hostilities, whether in international or non-international armed conflict, is 
often uncertain when applied to specific cases” at 507); ICRC 2003 Report, supra note 11 (“the 
notion of direct participation is a legal issue that merits further reflection and study, as well as 
an effort to arrive at proposals for clarification of the concept” at 10).
135 See Schmitt, ibid. at 508.
136 For a summary and discussion of the ICRC’s recommendations on the meaning of direct 
participation in hostilities following a five-year expert consultative process, see ICRC, “Direct 
Participation”, supra note 115.
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 To determine when civilians may lose their immunity, it is necessary to iden-
tify what constitutes “hostilities.” As the Israel Supreme Court noted, “the ac-
cepted view is that ‘hostilities’ are acts which by nature and objective are intend-
ed to cause damage to the [opposing party].”137 The ICRC Commentary to the 
Additional Protocols supports this finding: “Hostile acts should be understood to 
be acts which by their nature and purpose are intended to cause actual harm to 
the personnel and equipment of the armed forces.”138 Significantly, “hostilities” 
are not confined solely to harmful acts against the army or the State: “It also ap-
plies to hostilities against the civilian population of the state.”139 Such activity is 
widely accepted to include using weapons, gathering intelligence, and preparing 
for hostilities;140 the use of a weapon is not necessary.141
 Requiring civilians to refrain from taking a direct part in hostilities indicates 
that civilians who indirectly participate are not lawful targets. As such, the mean-
ing of direct participation is important, especially for determining the lawfulness 
of targeting the leadership of terrorist organizations who may be directing ter-
rorist attacks, but not committing them personally. As noted above, there is 
no clear definition of what constitutes such direct participation.142 The ICRC 
Commentary to API discusses direct participation, and notes that it “implies a 
direct causal relationship between the activity engaged in and the harm done to 
the enemy at the time and place where the activity occurs.”143 This requirement 
is also found in the Commentary to APII, suggesting that a causal relationship 
is necessary in both international and non-international armed conflicts.144 In 
Targeted Killings, the Court determined that, “a civilian bearing arms (openly or 
concealed)… on his way to the place where he will use them against the enemy, 
at such place, or on his way back from it, is a civilian taking an ‘active part’ in 
137 Targeted Killings, supra note 4 at para. 33.
138 Yves Sandoz et al, eds., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ICRC: Geneva, 1987) at para. 1348 at para. 1942 [Additional 
Protocols Commentary].
139 Targeted Killings, supra note 4 at para. 33.
140 Ibid. See also, ICRC 2003 Report, supra note 11 (In light of widespread uncertainty regarding 
direct participation, the ICRC organized a seminar with IHL experts in an effort to clarify the 
concept. There was a broad consensus among the attending experts that “civilians attacking 
or trying to capture members of the enemy’s armed forces or their weapons, equipment or 
positions, or laying down mines or sabotaging lines of military communication should be 
considered directly participating in hostilities,” Annex I at 28).
141 See e.g. Additional Protocols Commentary, supra note 138 (“It appears that the word ‘hostilities’ 
covers not only the time that the civilian actually makes use of the weapon, but also… the time 
that he is carrying it, as well as situations in which he undertakes hostile acts without using a 
weapon” at para. 1943).
142 See e.g. Targeted Killings, supra note 4 (“It seems accepted in the international literature that 
an agreed upon definition of the term ‘direct’ in the context under discussion does not exist” at 
para. 34); see Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 53 (“It is fair to conclude… that a clear 
and uniform definition of direct participation has not been developed in state practice” at 23).
143 Additional Protocols Commentary, supra note 138 at para. 1679.
144 Ibid. (“The notion of direct participation in hostilities implies that there is a sufficient causal 
relationship between the act of participation and its immediate consequences” at para. 4787). 
See Schmitt, “Direct Participation”, supra note 132 (“Direct participation… seemingly requires 
a ‘but for’ causation and causal proximity to the foreseeable consequences of the act” at 508).
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the hostilities,” while the same cannot be said of a civilian who only “generally 
supports the hostilities.”145 Accordingly, a civilian who sells goods to, expresses 
sympathy for the cause of, or fails to act to prevent an attack by one of the armed 
parties to a conflict would be only indirectly participating because these acts do 
“not involve acts of violence which pose an immediate threat of actual harm to 
the adverse party.”146 Between these extremes is a range of activity subject to 
competing interpretations. Michael N. Schmitt favours a liberal approach:
One of the seminal purposes of the law is to make possible a 
clear distinction between civilians and combatants. Suggesting 
that civilians retain their immunity even when they are intri-
cately involved in the conflict is to engender disrespect for the 
law by combatants endangered by their activities. Moreover, 
a liberal approach creates an incentive for civilians to remain 
as distant from the conflict as possible – in doing so they can 
better avoid being charged with participation in the conflict 
and are less liable to being directly targeted.147
Although such an interpretation may have persuasive value because it could en-
courage the maintenance of the distinction between civilians and combatants, 
care must be taken to not erode the protected status of civilians. In contrast, 
Antonio Cassese argues that a narrow interpretation is necessary because it “is 
linked to the need to avoid killing innocent civilians.”148 Mindful of these di-
vergent views, the Israel Supreme Court held that direct participation should 
include: collecting intelligence on the opposing party; transporting individuals 
who are taking a direct part in the hostilities; and operating, supervising or 
servicing weapons the parties use.149 The Court also considered that a civilian 
driving a vehicle carrying ammunition should be seen as taking a direct part 
in hostilities, while indirect participation includes aiding a party by “general 
strategic analysis;” and supporting a party logistically, monetarily, or general-
ly.150 Significantly, the Court also held that leadership activities would constitute 
direct participation:
We have seen that a civilian causing harm to the army is tak-
ing ‘a direct part’ in hostilities. What says the law about those 
who enlist him to take a direct part in the hostilities, and 
145 Targeted Killings, supra note 4 at para. 34.
146 Ibid.
147 Schmitt, “Direct Participation”, supra note 132 at 509.
148 Cited in Targeted Killings, supra note 4 at para. 34 (emphasis in original).
149 Ibid. para. 35.
150 Ibid. Although the Court’s holding was framed with respect to the activities of the non-State 
actors under consideration, it has implications for the armed forces of the State as well. The 
long-standing lack of consensus regarding direct participation is due in large part to civilian 
involvement in the war effort; in light of the Court’s willingness to interpret direct participation 
somewhat broadly, it would be prudent for State armed forces to ensure that civilians do not 
perform the functions noted above.
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those who send him to commit hostilities? Is there a differ-
ence between his direct commanders and those responsible 
for them? Is the ‘direct’ part taken only by the last terror-
ist in the chain of command, or by the entire chain? In our 
opinion, the ‘direct’ character of the part taken should not be 
narrowed merely to the person committing the physical act of 
attack. Those who have sent him, as well, take ‘a direct part’. 
The same goes for the person who decided upon the act, and 
the person who planned it. It is not to be said about them 
that they are taking an indirect part in the hostilities. Their 
contribution is direct (and active).151
In light of the causal relationship arguably required for direct participation, con-
sidering leading, commanding, planning, and enlisting as direct participation is 
supportable; in most cases, “but for” such actions, the hostile acts under ques-
tion would not occur, while the harm arising from the acts is not only reasonably 
foreseeable, it is intended. Also supporting this interpretation is the fact that 
considering individuals engaged in leadership or planning activities to be lawful 
targets of attack could act as a disincentive for engaging in such activity.152 The 
above interpretation may also be consistent with the recent recommendations of 
the ICRC on the meaning of direct participation in hostilities, as it would satisfy 
its “cumulative criteria” of: (i) threshold of harm; (ii) direct causation; and, (iii) 
a belligerent nexus.153
3. Duration of Participation and Avoiding the Revolving Door of 
Combatancy
 According to both Additional Protocols, civilians lose their immunity from 
attack “for such time” as their direct participation lasts. 154 The duration of par-
ticipation is a crucial issue because it is a key feature of a civilian’s protection 
from attack. In contrast, combatants (i.e., members of a State’s armed forces) 
remain lawful targets of attack for the duration of an armed conflict, regardless 
151 Ibid. at para. 36.
152 This may also mirror the status of the military commanders in a State’s armed forces, as they are 
lawful targets of attack during an armed conflict regardless of their location on the battlefield or 
outside of the field of conflict (it should be noted, however, that civilian political leaders who 
authorize the mission may not necessarily be considered lawful targets); see Green, supra note 
57 at 169-70.
153 See ICRC, “Direct Participation,” supra note 115 (“In order to qualify as direct participation in 
hostilities, a specific act must meet the following cumulative criteria: 1. the act must be likely 
to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict 
or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against 
direct attack (threshold of harm); 2. there must be a direct causal link between the act and the 
harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which 
that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation); 3. the act must be specifically designed 
to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the 
detriment of another (belligerent nexus)” at 995-96).
154 This applies to both international and non-international armed conflicts; see API, supra note 
52, art. 51(3) and APII, supra note 52, art. 13(3).
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of whether they are directly participating in hostilities. In Targeted Killings, Israel 
argued that the temporal aspect of the loss of civilian immunity from attack was 
not part of customary international law and, as such, a third category of unlaw-
ful combatant exists and such persons could, as a party to the armed conflict, 
be lawfully targeted for the duration of the hostilities.155 The Court rejected 
this argument, holding that the temporal condition forms part of customary 
international law that was binding despite the fact that Israel has not ratified 
API.156 Given the fact that API has not been universally ratified, this finding is 
significant. Although it imposes greater restrictions on the targeting of suspected 
terrorists, it is argued that maintaining this temporal requirement is supportable 
because it would restrict the ability of States to target suspected terrorists only 
when they pose a continuing threat to the State, and is consistent with Com-
mon Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, which protects “persons taking no 
active part in the hostilities.”157 If suspected terrorists remained subject to lawful 
targeting even when their participation has definitively ceased, Common Article 
3, which represents customary international law, may be undermined. It is also 
argued that relaxing the rules of targeting to the extent proposed by Israel in 
Targeted Killings would increase the threat to the innocent civilian population 
in which the suspected terrorist is based, which strengthens the argument for 
restricting lawful targeting.
 Despite the customary status of the duration of participation requirement, 
there may be some flexibility within the meaning of “for such time.” A literal 
interpretation would require an individual’s direct participation in hostilities at 
the moment the State attacks. The ICRC Commentary could support this ap-
proach, as it provides that direct participation includes “preparations for combat 
and return from combat,” but notes that, “[o]nce he ceases to participate, the 
civilian regains his right to the protection.”158 Many commentators are con-
155 Targeted Killings, supra note 4 at paras. 11-12.
156 Ibid. (The Court rejected Israel’s argument that the only customary provision of art. 51(3) 
was the requirement to take a direct part in hostilities and the “for such time” clause did not 
reflect customary IHL: “all of the parts of article 51(3) of the First Protocol express customary 
international law” at para. 30).
157 The ICJ has recognized that the provisions of Common Article 3 represent a “minimum 
yardstick” applicable to both international and non-international armed conflicts; see Nicaragua, 
supra note 21 (“[Common] Article 3… defines certain rules to be applied in the armed conflicts 
of a non-international character. There is no doubt that, in the event of international armed 
conflicts, these rules also constitute a minimum yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate 
rules which also apply to international conflicts; and they are rules which, in the Court’s 
opinion, reflect what the Court in 1949 called ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ [and 
were held to form part of customary law applicable to international armed conflicts in Corfu 
Channel]” at para. 218).
158 Additional Protocols Commentary, supra note 138 at paras. 1943 and 1944; see Schmitt, 
“Direct Participation”, supra note 132 at 510. The ICRC has recently confirmed its continued 
recommendation of this interpretation of the duration of direct participation, see ICRC, “Direct 
Participation”, supra note 115 (“Measures preparatory to the execution of a specific act of direct 
participation in hostilities, as well as the deployment to and the return from the location of its 
execution, constitute an integral part of the act” while “civilians lose protection against direct 
attack for the duration of each specific act amounting to direct participation in hostilities” 
at 996. [emphasis added]).
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cerned that a narrow interpretation could create a “revolving door” of combat-
ancy, whereby protected status is regained once a specific act of direct participa-
tion ends, despite the fact that the individual may be determined to commit 
future—and potentially already planned—attacks. In light of this possibility, 
Schmitt asks: “Can an individual be a guerrilla by night and a farmer by day? 
Do [civilians engaged in hostilities] regain their immunity from direct attack 
whenever they successfully return from an operation, only to reenter the fray at 
a later time?”159
 As noted above, the ICRC has recently refined its recommendations on the 
temporal scope of loss of protection, proposing that members of organized non-
State armed groups would lose protection “for as long as they assume their con-
tinuous combat function.”160 Although this recommendation may clarify the 
status of members of such armed groups, it does not resolve the existence of the 
“revolving door” for loosely organized non-State actors. Given, however, that 
such individuals would retain their civilian status, it may be that the revolving 
door is unavoidable. As the ICRC notes, this result may also be desirable:
The revolving door of civilian protection is an integral part, 
not a malfunction, of IHL. It prevents attacks on civilians 
who do not, at the time, represent a military threat. In con-
trast to members of organized armed groups, whose continu-
ous function it is to conduct hostilities on behalf of a party to 
the conflict, the behaviour of individual civilians depends on 
a multitude of constantly changing circumstances and, there-
fore, is very difficult to anticipate.161
The ICRC further notes that this difficulty is an acceptable price to pay to en-
sure the protection of the innocent civilian population:
Although the mechanism of the revolving door of protection 
may make it more difficult for the opposing armed forces or 
organized armed groups to respond effectively to the direct 
participation of civilians in hostilities, it remains necessary 
to protect the civilian population from erroneous or arbi-
trary attack and must be acceptable for the operating forces 
or groups as long as such participation occurs on a merely 
spontaneous, unorganized or sporadic basis.162
 In contrast, Schmitt argues that the underlying humanitarian purpose of IHL 
would not permit a revolving door because it would expose the entire civilian 
population to greater danger, as combatants faced with repeated attacks by civil-
159 Schmitt, ibid.
160 ICRC, “Direct Participation”, supra note 115 at 1034.
161 Ibid at 1034.
162 Ibid. at 1034-35.
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ians who “opt in and opt out of hostilities” would “lose respect for the law.”163 
According to Schmitt, the only practical approach during an armed conflict is 
that, “[o]nce an individual has opted into the hostilities, he or she remains a valid 
military target until unambiguously opting out,” which could “occur through 
extended non-participation or an affirmative action of withdrawal.”164 He argues 
that this would deter participation, as “the greater [a person’s] susceptibility to 
attack, the greater the incentive to stay out of the conflict.”165 Schmitt’s position 
may be persuasive if it prevents the erosion of the principle of distinction and 
encourages civilians to not participate in hostilities. Normatively, it could be 
argued that non-State actors engaged in armed conflict should not be able to use 
the fact that the law does not provide a clear answer with respect to their status 
to enjoy more benefits than combatants. However, care must be taken to avoid 
eroding both the protections innocent civilians enjoy and the textual provisions 
of IHL treaties; Schmitt’s proposal would effectively substitute unambiguous re-
nunciation of direct participation for the requirement of “for such time,” which 
would give States more freedom to target civilians who participate in hostilities. 
Since this would result in a greater risk of harm to innocent civilians, such a 
change in the law may be imprudent.
 A key factor in resolving the meaning of “for such time” is the nature of a 
person’s participation in hostilities. Two extremes are possible. In one, a person 
takes a direct part during a single instance or only sporadically. In the other, a 
person joins an armed group and as a member of such a group commits a chain 
of hostilities with short periods of time between acts. In the former situation, the 
Israel Supreme Court held in Targeted Killings that such a person, “starting from 
the time he detached himself from that activity, is entitled to protection from 
attack”, while in the latter, the person “loses his immunity from attack ‘for such 
time’ as he is committing the chain of acts… regarding such a civilian, the rest 
in between hostilities is nothing other than preparation for the next hostility.”166 
This conclusion largely mirrors the recent recommendation of the ICRC, as its 
interpretation of the law would permit targeting members of non-State armed 
groups who are continuously engaged in hostilities. It is argued that this ap-
proach is superior to requiring an individual to signal that he or she has opted 
out of hostilities to regain protection from attack, as it may be more compatible 
with the meaning of “for such time” by requiring a person to be committing a 
chain of attacks to remain a lawful target.
 It has also been argued that membership in a non-State group that is party 
to an armed conflict could be sufficient participation for a person to lose im-
munity from attack—for such time as a person is a member in a group, this 
would constitute direct participation.167 Kretzmer adopts this position, arguing 
163 Ibid. at 1035.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
166 Targeted Killings, supra note 4 at para. 39 (emphasis added).
167 ICRC 2003 Report, supra note 11 (This issue was discussed at the ICRC seminar, and the 
general consensus among experts was that, in international armed conflicts, “such an approach 
could not be justified either on the basis of the plain language of the Geneva Conventions or 
of Additional Protocol I, nor on the legislative history of the relevant provisions.” The situation 
67422-1 Windsor Yearbook.indb   315 8/5/10   10:48:20 AM
316 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 2009
that membership in the military wing of such a group should determine com-
batancy, rather than individual actions.168 Such an approach, however, creates 
a clear risk that civilians who are not directly participating in hostilities would 
lose their immunity from attack, contrary to IHL. In light of the potential for 
this to undermine the rights of innocent civilians, it is argued that requiring an 
individual to commit a chain of hostile acts while being a member of a non-State 
armed group is a more appropriate approach than basing lawful targeting on 
membership alone.169 As Melzer argues, this “functional membership approach” 
is appropriate because it “seems to most accurately reflect the logic, intent and 
text of IHL.”170 It also restricts the definition of civilians—and thereby those 
individuals to whom the revolving door is available—to “only armed actors 
whose direct participation in hostilities is unorganized, spontaneous or sporadic 
in nature.”171
 When undertaking targeted attacks during an armed conflict, the State will 
remain bound by the fundamental principles of IHL that protect the rights of 
innocent civilians (e.g., distinction, proportionality, and the requirement to take 
precautions in their attacks). Targeted attacks are further constrained because 
civilian status is presumed where there is doubt regarding the person’s status; 
therefore, verification of status through reliable evidence is required before an 
attack.172 The Israel Supreme Court has noted that the law requires that the 
was determined to be “less clear” during non-international armed conflicts, as “some experts 
underscored that there were additional legal arguments and practical justifications that could 
be used to sustain a collective approach in this context,” and “suggested that… membership in 
a military organization could result in loss of immunity from attack as long as the organization 
functioned like a military units” Appendix I at 33). 
168 Kretzmer, supra note 29 (He argues that targeting could be based on four factors: (i) past 
practices of the group; (ii) if the group has articulated goals that suggest a long-term conflict 
with the State; (iii) if contemporary events have relaxed or exacerbated tensions; and (iv) if 
intelligence information suggesting that an operation is being planned at 193-94). Although 
these criteria may reflect an interpretation of what “armed forces” may mean in the context of 
non-international armed conflicts, this proposal has implications on the meaning of “direct 
participation” and “for such time,” as it would effectively remove these requirements for making 
civilians lawful targets of attack.
169 This position is also consistent with the recommendation of the ICRC that members or 
organized non-State armed groups be engaged in a “continuous combat function” to be a 
lawful target; see ICRC, “Direct Participation,” supra note 115. For a detailed discussion of the 
“functional membership” approach, see Melzer, supra note 10 at 350-53.
170 Melzer, ibid, at 352.
171 Ibid. at 353.
172 See API, supra note 52 (“In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be 
considered to be a civilian”, art. 50(1)); Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 53, “rule 6” 
(“when there is a situation of doubt, a careful assessment has to be made under the conditions 
and restraints governing a particular situation as to whether there are sufficient indications to 
warrant an attack. One cannot automatically attack anyone who might appear dubious” at 
24). Identifying a requisite standard of proof is difficult, as it would likely depend upon the 
circumstances; however, the Court in Targeted Killings noted that the burden is “heavy”; see 
Targeted Killings, supra note 4 at para. 40; see also Kretzmer, supra note 29 (“As there is always 
a risk that the persons attacked are not in fact terrorists, even in such a case lethal force may be 
used against the terrorists only when a high probability exists that if immediate action is not 
taken another opportunity will not be available to frustrate the planned terrorist attacks” at 
203).
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State target a civilian only where there is credible evidence of active partici-
pation: “Information which has been most thoroughly verified is needed re-
garding the identity and activity of the civilian who is allegedly taking part in 
the hostilities.”173 As Cassese notes, this requirement is necessary to ensure the 
fundamental protection civilians enjoy from attack:
[I]f a belligerent were allowed to fire at enemy civilians simply 
suspected of somehow planning or conspiring to plan military 
attacks, or of having planned or directed hostile actions, the 
basic foundations of international humanitarian law would 
be seriously undermined. The basic distinction between civil-
ians and combatants would be called into question and the 
whole body of law relating to armed conflict would eventu-
ally be eroded.174
Significantly, the Court also held that, even during an armed conflict, a State 
may only use lethal force against a civilian suspected of participating in hostil-
ities if there are no less harmful means available.175 Since Israel is an occupying 
power exercising control over the territory in which it engages in the targeted 
attacks at issue in Targeted Killings,176 this requirement (ie. to pursue available 
less harmful means) may be more easily satisfied in that case. It may be less likely, 
however, that a State targeting suspected terrorists in the territory of another 
State would be able to detain, arrest, and try suspected terrorists. As such, with-
out the assistance or co-operation of the territorial State, the State using force 
against a suspected terrorist based in another State could argue that it had no 
choice of means. Where the State has targeted a civilian, it may also be required 
to undertake or submit to an independent investigation, and pay compensation 
when it unlawfully harms an innocent civilian or its actions amount to a serious 
violation of IHL.177 Although the requirements outlined above would limit the 
ability of States to use lethal force against suspected terrorists, it is argued that 
these requirements are not only consistent with the customary understandings 
of IHL, but reflect the continued applicable of IHRL during times of armed 
conflicts and respect for the right to life.
173 Targeted Killings, ibid., citing Ergi v. Turkey, 32 EHRR 388 (2001).
174 Cited in Targeted Killings, ibid.
175 Ibid. (“Thus, if a terrorist taking a direct part in hostilities can be arrested, interrogated, and 
tried, those are the means which should be employed… Trial is preferable to use of force. A 
rule-of-law state employs, to the extent possible, procedures of law and not procedures of force” 
at para. 40).
176 Ibid. at paras. 18 and 40.
177 See Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 114; see also ibid. (“after an attack on a civilian 
suspected of taking an active part, at such time, in hostilities, a thorough investigation 
regarding the identification of the target and the circumstances of the attack upon him is to be 
performed (retrospectively). That investigation must be independent…. In appropriate cases it 
is appropriate to pay compensation as a result of harm caused to an innocent civilian” at para. 
40); see also, Helen Duffy, The “War on Terror” and the Framework of International Law (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 310.
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VI. CONCLUSION
 Targeted killings of suspected terrorists will remain controversial outside of 
and during armed conflicts. In order to ensure the adequate protection of civil-
ians, it is argued that the stringent requirements of IHRL for the use of lethal 
force outside of armed conflicts must be maintained. In the context of armed 
conflicts, the revolving door of combatancy should be avoided in a manner that 
attempts to ensure that only persons directly participating in hostilities are law-
ful targets of attack. It is recognized that, to some extent, the revolving door 
cannot be avoided because an individual who has ceased to directly participate 
could decide to re-engage in hostilities. It is undeniable that accepting the literal 
meaning of “for such time” as the basis for targeting civilians who take a direct 
part in hostilities would ensure the maximum protection for innocent civilians 
because there can be no doubt about such a person’s status and it would se-
verely limit a State’s ability to undertake such targeted attacks. When, however, 
a non-State armed group is sufficiently organized to be identifiable as a party to 
an armed conflict, it may be justified to adopt a somewhat more liberal inter-
pretation in order to avoid the revolving door of combatancy. Membership and 
ongoing direct participation in the activities of the military wing of an organ-
ized non-State group that is party to a conflict may be useful for determining a 
person’s status and represent a balance between military necessity and the rights 
of innocent civilians.
 It must be stressed that, in all circumstances, the State cannot act on suspi-
cion alone: outside of armed conflicts, its use of lethal force must be absolutely 
necessary and meet the stringent requirements of IHRL, while it cannot target a 
person during an armed conflict where the person’s status as a lawful target is in 
doubt. Unless the requirements outlined above are met when a State targets sus-
pected terrorists, the legal protections innocent civilians enjoy could be severely 
undermined. In the end, a person’s status must be determined on a case-by-case 
basis; in all cases, the law requires the State to have reasonable grounds—based 
on reliable evidence—to believe that an individual is a lawful target and to make 
this determination in good faith.
 It is apparent that international law provides substantial protection for the 
rights and lives of innocent civilians. This protection, however, is only as strong 
as the adherence of States—and non-State actors—to their legal obligations. The 
International Commission of Jurists’ assessment of the reaction of States to the 
threat of transnational terrorism is blunt:
Terrorism sows terror, and many States have fallen into a trap 
set by the terrorists. Ignoring lessons from the past, some States 
have allowed themselves to be rushed into hasty responses, 
introducing an array of measures which are undermining 
cherished values as well as the international legal framework 
carefully evolved over at least the last half-century.178
178 International Commission of Jurists, Report, supra note 8 at 159.
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In light of the fact that customary international law is developed by State prac-
tice, violations of IHL and IHRL should attract international condemnation. 
States should not tolerate breaches of IHL or IHRL simply because it is difficult 
to “fight” terrorism. As the Commission notes, “[t]he damage done [since Sep-
tember 11, 2001] to the rule of law must be repaired and the importance and 
value of upholding international humanitarian law and human rights law dur-
ing all armed conflicts [and presumably outside of armed conflicts as well] must 
be re-affirmed.”179 If States endorse or acquiesce to tactics that do not respect 
the rule of law and the rights of individuals, the risk of harm to innocent civil-
ians may be grave. Maintaining stringent restraints on the use of lethal force by 
States against suspected terrorists could also increase the incentive for States to 
explore other means to combat the threat of terrorism, while they retain the right 
to use lethal force when the requirements of the law are met. At a minimum, 
States should protest breaches of IHRL and IHL that occur during the fight 
against transnational terrorism. Ideally, States would be held accountable for 
their breaches of the law.180 If States prevent and react to the threat of transna-
tional terrorism in ways that respect international law and the rights of individu-
als, it is hoped that the destabilizing effects of terrorism may be minimized. The 
importance of ensuring the protection of innocent civilians and respect for the 
rule of law may be underscored by the words of Sergio Vieira de Mello, the late 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights who died in a terrorist attack: “I 
am convinced that the best—the only—strategy to isolate and defeat terrorism 
is by respecting human rights, fostering social justice, enhancing democracy and 
upholding the primacy of the rule of law.”181
179 Ibid. at 160.
180  See Right for a Remedy and Reparation, supra note 114. 
181 Qtd. in Schmid, supra note 72.
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